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CHAPTER 17
The Resistible Rise of Italy’s Metropolitan Regions
The Politics of Sub-National Government Reform in Postwar Italy1
Simon Parker
Introduction
much of the literature of the 1990s and 2000s on urban and 
regional governance was dominated by the themes of globalization and 
state re-scaling, which were identified as the twin drivers of a re-territori-
alization of governance at the metropolitan-regional scale (Cox 1993; Cox 
1997; Swyngedouw and Cox 1997; Brenner 1998a; Brenner 1998b; 
MacLeod and Goodwin 1999; MacLeod 2001; Swyngedouw and Baeten 
2001; Brenner 2002; Keil 2003; Brenner 2004). A review of the actual 
“on the ground” transformation of cities and regions into strong state 
actors with considerable powers of political and economic sovereignty 
reveals a much more complicated picture, however. Indeed because of its 
essentially normative and pluralist conceptualization it is hard to identify 
where “new regionalism” really has emerged even in the European Union, 
where for a time Jacques Delors’s enthusiastic vision of “a Europe of the 
Regions” offered the promise of a new era of politically and economically 
assertive sub-national governments (Scott 2009).
A surge of research articles and reports in the 1990s pointed to what 
can only be described as “the return of the region” as a territorial scale 
of key importance to students of economic geography, political science 
and public administration, urban and regional sociology, planning, inter-
national relations, and related disciplines (Harrison 2008a, 2008b). The 
reasons for this upsurge in interest differed across the disciplinary fields, 
however. For economic geographers the key work of Michael Storper, Ed 
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Soja, and Allen Scott (Scott and Soja 1996; Scott, Agnew et al. 2001; Scott 
and Storper 2003; Scott 2011; Soja 2014) on regions as centres of eco-
nomic production built on that of writers such as Ash Amin and Nigel 
Thrift on Post-Fordist agglomeration economies (Amin 1990, Amin and 
Thrift 1992). Distinctive sub-national patterns of industrial production, 
innovation, and design with clear geographical “clustering” had been 
identified by Bagnasco (1977), Sabel and Piore (1984), and Sabel and 
Amin (1994), notably in the so-called “Third Italy” but with similar indus-
trial district features in Bavaria and Baden-Wurttemberg in Germany 
(Lechner and Dowling 1999, Semlinger 1993) and Catalonia and Euskadia 
(the Basque Country) in Spain (Santisteban 2006).
However, as Gordon, Harding, and Harloe argue in this volume, the 
tendency to attach primacy to the forces of globalization as the main agent 
of the re-scaling of territorial governance in a metropolitan direction pro-
vides, “…an insufficient basis for understanding how and why metropol-
itan governance is clearly emerging in some places, but not in others; how 
its form varies between places; how it succeeds and how it fails—and so 
on.” In the context of Italy, strongly integrated export-led regional econ-
omies and highly territorialized political subcultures are important factors 
in the contestation around regionalism and metropolitan government. 
Thus, despite the appearance of significant reterritorializing reforms in the 
1970s and more recently in the 1990s and 2000s, the re-scaling of gov-
ernment in Italy has been more defined by endogenous concerns surround-
ing the relative advantage to be gained by entrenched political and eco-
nomic interests than an exogenous “post-Fordist” adaptation to the new 
state spaces that might potentially result from the reconfiguration of global 
capital’s spatial fix in an Italian economy, which, despite its membership 
of the Eurozone, remains remarkably “sheltered” by international com-
parison (Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi 2007).
Centre and Periphery in Italy: A Brief History
Since the foundation of the modern Italian state in 1861, the one issue 
that has traditionally united nearly all the political factions has been that 
“the rule of the parties” (in Italian, the partitocrazia) should supersede 
“the reason of state,” and this is why it is so crucial to understand the 
primacy of politics in any discussion of the reform of the apparatus of 
government in Italy. For most of its history, “regional Italy,” to quote 
Metternich, existed as a geographical expression, while the ancient form 
of territorial government, the commune (comune), and to a lesser extent 
the province (provincia), was the main point of political reference and 
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source of collective identity. Although a regional dimension did exist prior 
to unification, this was generally a matter of imperial and ecclesiastical 
convenience rather than a genuine territorial expression of a distinct cul-
ture or “ethnos.” The delineation of regions in Italy in the nineteenth 
century was, as Pacini and Bramanti have termed it, “decided hurriedly 
and certainly not on the basis of criteria such as efficient governability and 
the economic and social needs of the territory” (Pacini and Bramanti 
1992). The latter part of this statement might equally well describe the 
much-delayed implementation of the “ordinary regions” in 1970, con-
ceded by a reluctant Christian Democrat party in return for the coalition 
support of the Italian Socialist Party.
While many in northern Italy in recent decades have shown dissatis-
faction with their national political space, this does not necessarily imply 
that the region provokes stronger feelings of political and cultural identi-
fication than other institutions, or that it represents an area of internal 
social, economic, and political homogeneity. Nor is it necessarily true that 
the performance of administrators and politicians at the regional level was 
any better than that of those at the national level. Given that the fifteen 
“ordinary” regions only began to assume greater importance in the 1970s, 
by which time the partitocrazia was firmly entrenched, the regions became 
not so much the harbingers of a new way of doing politics or a force for 
subsidiarity, but rather, as Gianfranco Miglio put it, “the most conserva-
tive part of the old and corrupt unitary state” (Miglio 1999: 65). There-
fore, as Murphy advocates, it is important to reflect both on how regions 
are perceived and understood by their inhabitants and “how and why that 
understanding has changed over time” (Murphy 1991: 24).
Although dissatisfaction with all levels of government in Italy is higher 
than the European average, opinion surveys consistently find a lower level 
of dissatisfaction with sub-national government. But this needs to be seen 
in the context of a generally low opinion of local and national government 
among Italians and much higher levels of support for the EU, public edu-
cation, the system of justice, the Catholic Church, the police and the armed 
forces, and the President of the Republic.2 However, because space does 
not allow an extensive discussion of the historical development of “auton-
omous” territorial government in Italy, I propose to confine my analysis 
to the rise of “ethno-regionalist” autonomism in the late 1980s and 1990s; 
the impact of the local government reforms of the 1990s and the centre-left 
constitutional reforms (1999–2001); the implementation of limited 
regional devolution under the centre right Bossi-Berlusconi administration 
in the 2000s; the increasing importance of regional economic space in the 
reconfiguration of territorial government; and the most recent creation of 
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new metropolitan authorities under the centre-left government of Matteo 
Renzi. In concluding, I try to situate the Italian experience of regional and 
metropolitan government reform within a broader discussion of state 
re-scaling by insisting on the continued importance of organized politics 
in any reconfiguration of territorial governance in the Italian case.
“Fear of Falling”: Territorial Identity and the Demand for Local Autonomy 
On the face of it, the Italian experience seems to support the contention 
that the restructuring of sub-national levels of governance represents one 
of the key responses made by a national government to the managerial 
and economic problems thrown up by processes of globalization.  Here 
we have a case in which there has been substantial devolution and decen-
tralization of powers and resources to the regional and metropolitan scales 
at a pace that has quickened since the 1970s and led to significant growth 
in sub-national economic development and related functions, particularly 
at the regional level (Parker 2006). 
Toward the end of the 1980s, the newly-rich of the northern industrial 
districts began to suffer from what Tambini refers to as “a fear of falling” 
or “an insecurity born of economic uncertainty in the globalizing econ-
omy” (Tambini, 2004: 30). Neglected by its dominant party, Democrazia 
Cristiana (Christian Democracy, or DC), in favour of the large industries 
of the northwest and the south, the provincial north became an area that 
felt “economically central and politically peripheral” (Diamanti, 2001: 
296). Over the course of the 1980s, regional leagues demanding greater 
autonomy sprang up across northern Italy, with particular points of 
strength in provincial Veneto and Lombardy, i.e., “the North of small 
businesses and Catholic political traditions” (Diamanti, 1996: 125). Fol-
lowing the first seat gains in national elections of the Liga Veneta in 1983 
and the Lega Lombarda in 1987, the leagues were to enjoy a swift rise 
that would see the result of their fusion, the Lega Nord, become the second 
party in Lombardy, the Veneto, and Piedmont, and the third in Liguria, 
at the parliamentary elections of 1992. 
As Cento Bull and Gilbert assert, any understanding of the Lega Nord 
must be based on recognition of the nexus between the industrial districts 
of the provincial north of Italy and the emergence of the federalist Leagues. 
They argue that the Lega “took on the representation of the interests of 
a local model of economic development” when the DC was no longer able 
to do so effectively (Cento Bull and Gilbert, 2001: 102). Although derided 
by the established “system” parties, the Lega was expressing (albeit in 
populist terms) the needs of a specific territorial socio-economic 
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constituency and many of the issues raised first by the Lega—such as the 
need for federal and fiscal reform—have since been embraced by those 
who originally bristled at the very word “federalism,” most notably the 
dominant political figure of the Second Italian Republic—Silvio 
Berlusconi.
The Lega Nord, as a vocal opponent of the “Roman state” and its 
southern clientalist electoral base, succeeded in pushing the question of 
greater subnational autonomy up the political agenda. At the same time, 
the dramatic collapse of the major parties amidst the corruption scandals 
of the Tangentopoli period helped create the conditions by which changes 
at the subnational level would also become expedient for the governing 
class (Gundle and Parker 1996). The early 1990s would see a number of 
important reforms in this area, the most important being Law 81/1993 
that allowed for the direct election of the mayor over two rounds of voting 
and, through a “bonus” for the winning coalition, a guarantee of an 
absolute majority. The mayor was also given the power to appoint the 
members of the council executive and this, while still leaving the mayor 
with the task of keeping the different parties in the victorious coalition 
happy, has helped to promote a greater degree of efficiency and account-
ability. The enhancement of the powers and autonomy of city mayors 
under these reforms has even led one commentator to refer to the new 
municipal polity as “semi-presidentialist” (Fabbrini, 2001).
While the level of political interest and contestation increased with the 
introduction of the direct election of city mayors and the reorganization 
of communal administration (Law 142/1990), later incorporated into the 
so-called Bassanini II law 127/1997, the boost to the institutional legiti-
macy of larger city authorities which reformers hoped would result has 
failed to materialize. Law 142/1990 certainly constituted a re-territorial-
ization of government in that it gave elected local authorities the right to 
devise their own statutes, to initiate inter-authority cooperation, and to 
directly elect the head of the political executive—all of which were subse-
quently adopted by Constitutional Law 1/1999 with respect to regional 
government. As a result of these reforms the commune was re-established 
as the basic unit of local government, having responsibility for all the 
functions and services relating to the population of its territory other than 
those explicitly attributed to other authorities (Vandelli 2000: 98). In 
addition, nine new metropolitan authorities were created, including Turin, 
Milan, Venice, Bologna, Florence, Rome, Bari, Naples, and Cagliari. A 
further Constitutional Law, passed in October 2001, gave formal recog-
nition to the metropolitan cities as an autonomous level of government 
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under Title V of the Italian Constitution—the first time a new tier of 
government has been constitutionally recognized since the birth of the 
Republic in 1948. However, it was not until the law on fiscal federalism 
was passed in 2009 (Law 42/2009) that metropolitan government was 
provided with the necessary finance to assume the range of responsibilities 
that its expanded powers and territories would require. In the same year, 
Reggio Calabria was instituted as a metropolitan city by the Berlusconi 
government, taking the number of officially designated “city-regions” to 
ten.
Under the original legislation, the implementation of the new metro-
politan authorities required the voluntary agreement of the provincial 
capital, the province, and the surrounding (generally smaller) communes 
that would eventually form part of the città metropolitana (metropolitan 
city). L.265/99 disposed with the requirement for the metropolitan city 
and the province in which it is based to reach an accord, but neither was 
the establishment of a metropolitan authority to be mandatory. Instead, 
the host region, the major city commune and its surrounding local author-
ities, had the power to define a “wide area” metropolitan government 
boundary through mutual agreement. 
One of the last acts of the centre-left government led by Massimo 
D’Alema was to pass a constitutional law in March 2001 (by all of four 
votes) which, because it altered the provisions of the Constitution without 
a two-thirds majority from each Chamber, had to be subject to a popular 
referendum in order for the Act to be brought into force. In essence, the 
legislation, which was approved after the success of the referendum held 
on October 7, 2001, consolidated and gave constitutional status to the 
reforms of local and regional government that had been introduced since 
1990. The most important constitutional and jurisdictional innovation 
was the establishment of the principle of subsidiarity as a basis of the 
framework of government, which brought to an end a great deal of the 
supervisory powers of central government and the courts on sub-national 
administration. 
However, the reform also represented a hurried measure by the gov-
ernment in the run-up to the May 2001 elections in order to show the 
electorate of the north, which had voted the Northern League and its allies 
in Berlusconi’s Forza Italia into power in a majority of regional govern-
ments, that it was doing something about delivering federal reform. Per-
haps reflecting the haste in which it was pushed through, the constitutional 
reform lacked, as Anna Cento Bull observed, a “clear-cut division of tasks 
and responsibilities” and seemed likely to give rise to “conflict between 
the different levels of government” (Cento Bull, 2002: 188). 
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With the passing of Constitutional Law 1/1999 and Constitutional 
Law 3/2001, together with ordinary laws 59/1997 and decree law 56/2000, 
the institutional architecture of sub-national government in Italy was sig-
nificantly refashioned. Legislation passed in 1999 established the direct 
election of the regional president (or rather it granted regional councils 
the powers to choose this form of election), and the 2001 constitutional 
law gave regions default responsibility for policy areas (either exclusively 
or concurrently) with central government other than those specifically 
excluded in the Act (such as defence, immigration, public order, etc.). 
Article 118 of Constitutional Law 3/2001 also applied the principle of 
subsidiarity to municipalities, giving them responsibility for functions 
other than those directly attributed to the state, regions or provinces (Cla-
rich and Pisaneschi 2001: 365).
The reforms of the centre-left Ulivo (Olive Tree) government could be 
defined as a period of “permissive decentralization” in that it was left to 
the regions and sub-regional authorities to decide how far and how fast 
they wished to use the new powers granted them by the ordinary and 
constitutional reforms. The legislation also gave regions more control over 
the distribution of decentralized funding under legislative decree 112/1998, 
and an early analysis of regional spending found that the regions were 
very reluctant to embrace fiscal federalism in their own jurisdiction with 
on average three-quarters of funding being held by the region, 22% being 
devolved to provincial governments and only 1.2% to the communes 
(Santori 2000). 
La Devolution
The emergence, for the first time since the Second World War, of “alter-
nation” in Italian national government has made for a febrile atmosphere 
in the context of sub-national governance reform. Italy’s rapidly re-mod-
elled party system produced a centre-right government in 1993 under 
Silvio Berlusconi, followed by a centre-left government in 1996 initially 
under Romano Prodi, the return of a Berlusconi-led coalition in 2001, and 
a narrow victory of the centre-left in 2006 which led to premature elec-
tions and the return of Berlusconi in 2008 until his forced exit in Novem-
ber 2011. Within the centre-right coalition, long-standing ideological 
differences between the ethno-nationalist Lega Nord is in stark contrast 
to the ultra-nationalism of the now disbanded “post-fascist” Alleanza 
Nazionale party, for whom the unity of Italy and a hostility to local and 
regional autonomy have long been a sine qua non of Gianfranco Fini’s 
political strategy. Fini’s opposition to federalism of a North American or 
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even German stamp explains in large measure the fairly modest transfer 
of central government policy responsibilities to the regions under the 
2001–2006 Berlusconi government, despite the fact that Umberto Bossi 
was nominally in charge of institutional reform and “la devolution.” 
Health care responsibilities had been transferred to regional governments 
as far back as 1976, and the 2001 reform really represented a completion 
of this process. The inclusion of community policing and vocational train-
ing as the second and third planks of the reform could hardly be compared 
even to the devolution reforms of Tony Blair’s government that saw the 
creation of a Scottish Parliament and a Welsh Assembly at the end of the 
1990s. 
With the election of the Casa delle Libertà (House of Freedom) coali-
tion in May 2001, the new minister for Institutional Reform and leader 
of the Lega Nord, Umberto Bossi, made it clear that in exchange for his 
party’s support, he wished to see the question of “devolution” resolved in 
two ways. First, he intended to make the newly strengthened regional 
authorities the sole vehicle for the “Decalogue of devolution reforms” his 
government intended to pilot through parliament. Second, Bossi intended 
to overcome power-sharing disputes by decentralizing the entire respon-
sibility for certain policy areas to the regions. What Bossi’s reforms delib-
erately lacked were enhanced powers and funding for the larger metro-
politan authorities, which, even in the northern regions, were prone to 
electing centre-left governments and thus challenging the authority of 
incumbent centre-right regional governors over matters such as health 
services, transport infrastructure, and economic development.
Instead, Bossi’s constitutional reform proposals were aimed at strength-
ening the “region at large” where Italy’s more conservative voters were 
concentrated in the smaller communes and less densely populated prov-
inces. These included measures to provide a new organization for the 
Constitutional Court that “takes account of regional realties,” the exten-
sion of parliamentary immunity to regional councillors and presidents, 
the reform of administrative justice, and the institution of a “Chamber of 
Autonomies,” which would be similar to the German Bundesrat and in 
effect replace the existing Senate. In addition, there would be five “ordi-
nary bills” related to the financing of local government, the limitation of 
substitutive powers on the part of the national government in relation to 
local authorities, the participation of the regions in European Union delib-
erations, international agreements, and the functions of the parliamentary 
commission for the regions.
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The specific responsibilities for which the regions were to be granted 
exclusive legislative competence included traditional policy areas such as 
health services, but also school provision and vocational training (although 
a national curriculum and a national examination system were to be 
retained), together with local policing. “Our federalism,” stated Bossi in 
his speech to the Senate at the launch of the Bill, “is founded on the 
principles of subsidiarity and autonomy,” <source needed> which was a 
far cry from his demand for an “Independent Padania” during the Lega’s 
secessionist phase. It represented a return to the party’s federalist stance, 
on which the Northern League had built its early successes in the late 
1980s and early 1990s (Diamanti) and from which it had shied away in 
the latter half of the decade following the (at least superficial) adoption 
of pro-federalist positions by most of the other parties on both left and 
right. 
With the passing of the devolution bill as part of the Berlusconi-led 
House of Freedom coalition’s constitutional package in the Senate on 
March 23, 2005, the Northern League was on the brink of achieving a 
significant degree of autonomy for the regions, including, crucially, the 
ability to retain a large proportion of tax receipts at the local level. How-
ever, Italy’s voters rejected the constitutional bill in the referendum held 
in June 2006. The degree of opposition or support for the Northern 
League’s “devolution max” proposals reflected the perceptions of those 
who stood to gain or lose most through fiscal federalism. Northern regions 
that are net contributors to the national budget, such as the Veneto, voted 
in favour by a margin of 55.3%, whereas in the southern region of Cal-
abria, which relies on substantial subsidies from Rome, 82% of voters 
opposed the measure. The so-called “fiscal federalism” reforms of the 
2009–2011 period were meant to implement Article 119 of the constitu-
tion, but, as Massetti and Sandri write, although the reforms “enhanced 
the fiscal powers of the regions,” the paradoxical change of the Berlusconi 
government’s intervention was to “[compress] their overall financial 
capacity” (Massetti and Sandri 2012: 6). Indeed from 2008 onwards there 
has been a move to provide “standard cost of program delivery” financing 
for services such as health and education based on the expenditures of the 
most efficient regions. This tends to penalise the less efficient regional and 
municipal governments of the south, which is why the government was 
forced to implement a five-year transition arrangement in order to soften 
the blow of sharply reduced financial support to these regions.
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Regional Economic Spaces and Territorial Governance
Traditionally, national governments had been content to deal directly with 
the major national employers when discussing economic strategy and sup-
port for industry, but from the 1970s the SME sector of “the Third Italy” 
(the centre-north and northeast) became increasingly important for the 
country’s export-led growth. Smaller firms are traditionally more reliant 
on locally provided services and infrastructure than large multinational 
conglomerates, but in many cases regional and local governments lacked 
the expertise and resources to support their burgeoning industrial districts 
adequately. Although in the case of Emilia-Romagna, the left-controlled 
regional government had proved very capable at providing collective ser-
vices for small industries, the same could not be said of the Christian 
Democrats and their governing partners in regions of the “white” subcul-
ture such as the Veneto (Cooke and Morgan 1998). At the same time, as 
the welfare state functions of local authorities continued to develop, there 
was a growing consensus in the 1980s that relations between local author-
ities and other public authorities and voluntary agencies needed to be 
better coordinated and professionalized at subnational level. The creation 
of “Territorial Pacts” between the various economic actors and public 
authorities operating at the local and regional level represented a concrete 
expression of the national government’s response to these demands, 
although the results were uneven across Italy as a whole (De Rita and 
Bonomi 1998).
Some commentators have seen regional government in Italy as an 
endogenous institutional fix for policy failure at the national level, often 
taking at face value the existence of “institutionally thick” regional gov-
ernments and strong regional economies, as if the two are necessarily and 
causally related (Putnam 1993). But the impressive take-off of the small 
and medium firm sector in the “Third Italy” regions of Marche, Umbria, 
Tuscany, Emilia-Romagna, Veneto, and Friuli-Venezia Giulia took place 
at a time in the 1970s when regional government was barely functional. 
Thus Rodríguez-Pose’s claim that the granting of autonomy to the (ordi-
nary) regions in 1970 led to “the setting up of regional institutions and 
policies which are at the base of the success of some of the local systems 
of governance” (2001: 30) fails to recognize that with the possible excep-
tion of Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany, regional administrations have been 
far less important than trade associations and municipal authorities in 
stimulating economic growth and enterprise in the Third Italy. For exam-
ple, the Veneto region, which has enjoyed some of the highest regional 
growth rates in Italy and which is home to some of the world’s most 
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successful companies (such as Benetton and Luxottica), had not even offi-
cially defined its industrial districts by the end of the 1990s.
There is also no evidence, in the case of Italy at least, that organized 
business interests have a clear notion of what the best spatial fix for enter-
prise should be in the context of the devolution reform process. Large-
scale Italian capital has until very recently been able mostly to ignore local 
and regional government, since key policy decisions regarding wages and 
employment, corporate taxation, competition policy, interest rates, credit, 
and overseas trade are decided in Rome or Brussels. Up until recently the 
main employers’ organization, Confindustria, has therefore adopted an 
essentially agnostic stance on the subject of federalism and devolution, 
preferring to respond only to reform proposals that are seen to be inimical 
to its specific interests. However, Italian business leaders are increasingly 
waking up to the fact that fiscal federalism threatens their special relation-
ship with Rome as the national government begins to lose its monopoly 
over key policy areas, while Italy’s weakened position in the Eurozone 
following the fiscal crisis of 2008 and the country’s growing debt problem 
has undermined the capacity of Italy’s banks and major companies to 
dictate terms to economic policy-makers. Indeed the former head of Con-
findustria and President of Ferrari, Luca Cordero di Montezemolo, pub-
licly criticized the Berlusconi-Bossi devolution process as a costly “mess” 
that would create more needless bureaucracy and increase costs to busi-
ness (L’Espresso 2005).
The Birth of the Metropolitan City
Since the decentralization reforms of the 1990s and 2000s, metropolitan 
mayors have enjoyed increased public profiles and lengthier tenures. 
Before the system was reformed, the average Italian mayor remained in 
office for a mere thirteen months. In 1997, by contrast, all those elected 
four years previously in the larger Italian cities were still in power. If we 
consider that during the same period, Italy had four different governments, 
this appears to indicate a break with the pattern of instability that for 
decades had linked local and national levels of government in Italy. The 
meteoric rise of Matteo Renzi, the youthful former mayor of Florence, to 
the head of Italy’s centre-left coalition national government in 2014, has 
re-focussed attention on the importance of city-regions as power bases for 
ambitious political leaders. Greater regional autonomy and a more exec-
utive-style mayorality in Italy’s larger cities have created new incentives 
and opportunities for local political actors who realize the importance of 
territorial affinity and the potential for achieving significant reforms at the 
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institutional and policy levels in a more devolved, sub-national polity.
It was therefore no surprise that soon into Renzi’s tenure as premier, 
the Italian parliament approved a law named after its ministerial sponsor 
and former mayor of Reggio Emilia, Graziano Delrio, which brought into 
being for the first time ten new metropolitan cities—Turin, Milan, Venice, 
Genoa, Bologna, Florence, Bari, Naples, and Reggio Calabria. As the 
national capital, Rome is provided with its own institutional arrangements 
that differ from the other metropolitan cities. Reggio Calabria’s metro-
politan authority will not be instituted until 2016, when the provincial 
council ends its mandate. The previously existing provinces which once 
provided the equivalent to county government are incorporated territori-
ally and administratively within these new metropolitan authorities. 
Rather than being directly elected by the residents of the province, under 
the new reform the president of the province and the provincial executive 
are elected by the mayors and councillors of the constituent provinces. 
The existing mayor of the largest city authority automatically becomes 
“mayor of the metropolitan city”—a type of super-mayor who is expected 
to work with a metropolitan council directly elected by the mayors and 
councillors of the component municipal authorities. The mayors of the 
existing provincial municipalities also constitute a “metropolitan confer-
ence,” but seemingly with advisory powers only.
Having been initiated by the “Spending Review” Law 135 of 2012 
aimed at curbing Italy’s budget deficit in line with its European Union 
Stability Pact obligations, Renzi’s local government reforms are intended 
to produce a more efficient integration of services, transport, and infra-
structure while professionalising the public administration by, for exam-
ple, removing political appointees from departmental executive roles and 
winding up agencies and local bodies that no longer serve a useful func-
tion. An explicit aim of the reform is to allow Italy’s major cities to develop 
more effective institutional arrangements with other European cities and 
city-regions.3 The act also transformed Italy’s provinces from direct-
ly-elected bodies to “wide area territorial authorities” (enti territoriali di 
area vasta) with the president of the province now elected by the mayors 
and the councillors of the component municipalities.4
This metropolitanization of the provinces with major urban centres 
has not been without its controversies or conflicts, however. For example, 
a number of local authorities surrounding the pre-existing commune of 
Venice tried unsuccessfully to escape incorporation into the new metro-
politan authority which has been criticized for failing to align with the de 
facto PaTreVe (Padua-Treviso-Venezia) city-region and for a lack of stra-
tegic thinking (Messina 2013). Other experiences have been more positive, 
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such as in the case of the “Milano Città Metropolitana” initiative launched 
by the existing Milan city authority in the run up to the official creation 
of the metropolitan authorities. This consultation involved an integrated 
series of projects and public events involving local stakeholders from the 
city’s universities to the provincial authority and local citizens’ groups 
looking at issues such as the judicial and administrative features of the 
new statute, land use planning, local economic development, and the 
re-organization of public services.5 Bologna, the capital of the Emilia-Ro-
magna, which historically has pioneered pro-citizen local government 
reform and decentralization (Parker 1992) has been at the forefront of 
public participation initiatives surrounding the introduction of the new 
metropolitan statute in January 2014. The component authorities in the 
province of Bologna organized a series of virtual and conventional “Town 
Meetings” with the support of the regional government and twenty local 
authority and civil society organizations facilitated by “Laboratorio 
Urbano” (Urban Laboratory) in line with a regional law requiring the 
direct participation of citizens and civic associations. As a result of this 
unprecedented consultation with civic groups, third sector organizations, 
business associations, and key local government bodies, the City Council 
of Bologna agreed to suspend its deliberations on the new metropolitan 
statute until the final document from the public consultation process has 
been published.6
As well as technical and functional requirements that every metropol-
itan statute must feature (such as how the authority will be organized, 
what powers will its different bodies enjoy, what coordination mechanisms 
will be in place to deliver services across the territory, etc.) the Delrio law 
provides for “facultative content” including the fundamental principles 
on which the new metropolitan authority bases its governing practice, 
such as, for example, in the case of Bologna, “solidarity, simplification, 
impartiality, tolerance, integration,” which allows each metropolitan city 
to constitutionalize to a degree its civic ethos and its relationship to the 
region, to the nation, and to the European Union.
Conclusion
The absent guests in many discussions of the re-scaling of the state are 
often the political actors who are charged with giving some coherence and 
vision to the institutional, social, and economic challenges that their cities 
and regions face in an increasingly uncertain world. Paolo Perulli acknowl-
edges this aspect of regionalism when he writes that “… the regional 
dimension … appears … as a response to a problem of legitimacy and 
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representation and not only in functional terms as one of economic struc-
ture” (Perulli 1998: 34). This view is echoed by Alan Pred, who argues 
that the “historical unfolding of local civil society has a certain degree of 
autonomy,” due to the “locally singular combination of presences and 
absences, the locally peculiar sedimentation of practical and discursive 
knowledge, of commonsense, of behavioural dispositions and coping 
mechanisms” (Pred 1989: 218 in Amin and Thrift 1994: 7). 
Neil Brenner also acknowledges the role of political actors, but essen-
tially as reactive agents of “global spatial restructuring” (1999), ascribing 
variety in the response to globalization at the city or regional level sub-
stantially to “… the territorial structure of state power” in each respective 
country (Brenner 1997). This vaunting of the “spatial fix” (Harvey 1982) 
or “spatio-temporal fix” (Jessop 2000, 2001) in terms of the logic of 
capitalist accumulation—what might be called “the re-scaling for capital 
thesis”—underplays the socio-cultural motifs of territorial identities and 
what Gramsci termed the hegemonic repertoires of “the historic bloc” in 
establishing, maintaining, and defending political legitimation (Gramsci, 
1971). Crucially, it also overplays and over-generalizes the “steering 
capacity” of governance under capitalism, ascribing to sub-national state 
bodies the ability and the will to offer local level Keynesian solutions to 
the supply-side problems engendered by the withdrawal of the (ubiqui-
tous) neo-liberal nation state from direct economic intervention (Jessop 
2000: 335).
Andrew Jonas endorses Kevin Cox’s suggestion “that more work needs 
to be done on showing how territorial politics are constitutive of state 
restructuring and rescaling rather than the other way round.” In his own 
study of New Regionalism in California with Pincetl (2006), Jonas also 
argues that “the rescaling of the state and governance around regions 
could be as much a strategic “bottom-up” outcome of organized business 
interests as it is a solution which is pursued in a unidirectional “top-down” 
fashion by (central) state interests” (Jonas 2012: 269). The same holds 
true for the halting and partial nature of devolution in Italy after 1948, 
where despite the arrival of populist ethno-regionalist parties such as the 
Lega Nord in the 1990s, a nationally territorialized and orientated party 
system has successfully guarded its monopoly of power against the decen-
tralising demands of a weakly organized metropolitan-regional polity.
With the election of the coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi in 2001 and 
its intention to introduce “la devolution,” the institutional reform process 
appeared to be leading Italy toward a quasi-federalist system at the 
regional level. A stance in keeping with a broadly neo-liberal approach 
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that favours greater sub-national self-determination and less reliance upon 
redistribution from “strong” to “weak” localities and regions. However, 
as I hope to have shown, the re-territorialization of government in Italy 
has been, and continues to be, more powerfully shaped by factors internal 
to its rigidly tribal politics than by external economic and political imper-
atives such as globalization and the exigencies of the European Union 
integration process. The Italian case of state restructuring is more consis-
tent with a crisis of legitimacy of the governing class and the party system 
than the re-scaling imperatives of neo-liberalism, and as such needs to be 
understood in its historical and political context. 
As with other movements for local and regional autonomy in Europe 
and North America, regionalist and autonomist support increasingly high-
lights cross-party resistance to the depoliticizing and centralizing opera-
tions of international government-finance coalitions such as the EU/IMF’s 
austerity-imposing Troika. A case in point is Italian comedian Beppe 
Grillo’s highly successful anti-big capital/big government Five Star citizen’s 
movement, which won a quarter of the popular vote in the Italian parlia-
mentary elections in February 2013, and which has identified radical plans 
for the overhaul of territorial government, including the abolition of the 
provinces and the amalgamation of communes under 5,000 inhabitants. 
Ironically, so-called anti-establishment political movements such as the 
Lega Nord and Five Star achieved their initial success at the head of city 
administrations, which had enjoyed greatly increased powers and financial 
autonomy due to the reforms of the mainstream parties.
The re-scaling of governance in Italy does engage, albeit largely rhe-
torically, with new public management and new institutionalist arguments 
around the more efficient management of cities and regions as distinct 
economic spaces, but in the absence of strong backing from regional and 
national economic elites, such policy-driven new regionalist arguments 
have never carried much sway. Thus while the “spending review” law 
allowing for the introduction of city-regions and the reduction in the 
number of provinces draws on the language of modernization and the 
control of public expenditure, in reality the long resisted rise of metropol-
itan government (like that of the regions before them) is a sign of the 
continuing sclerosis of the Italian political system.
In so far as Italy’s territorial government reforms represent a further 
attempt at territorial re-scaling, it is certainly being generated less from 
the logic circuits of global capital and more from globalization’s populist 
antinomies in civil society that are seeking to control and “re-humanise” 
state-capital power ensembles in a more localist, and according to critics, 
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chauvinist-populist, direction.7 Thus, in the context of Italy, regionaliza-
tion and metropolitanization can be seen as essentially political struggles 
that invoke the chimeras of globalization and Europeanization in the name 
of what remains a fundamentally partisan contest for all scales of gover-
nance in Italy.
Notes
 1 I am grateful to Duncan McDonnell for contributing to an earlier unpublished 
paper on which this chapter partially draws. 
 2 A Demopolis poll for the Catholic periodical ‘Famiglia Cristiana’ conducted in 
November 2011 found that only 19% of voters had faith in the Berlusconi gov-
ernment and 33% in the mayor of their city. Support for the President of the 
Republic Giorgio Napolitano ran at 82%, for the police 67%, for the Church 
60%, for magistrates 54%, for schools and universities 51% and for the European 
Union 42%. A survey for the newspaper ‘Sole 24 Ore’ conducted in 2008 found 
that support for the mayor of Italy’s principal cities averaged 55% with 91 mayors 
doing better than 50% satisfaction (Burroni et al., 2009: 1).
 3 ‘Città metropolitane, province, unione di comuni: in vigore la legge Delrio’ at 
www.governo.it/governoinforma/dossier/legge_province/
 4 The Renzi government claims to have saved over €100 million from abandoning 
direct elections to the Provincial authorities.
 5 Urbanistica Informazioni, 245–46, 2012, p. 36.
 6 Lo statuto della città metropolitana di bologna per la convivenza e la democrazia 
deliberativa, Bologna, 2014. www.bolognametropolitana.org/
 7 Wu Ming Foundation, “Grillismo: Yet another right-wing cult coming from Italy,” 
March 8, 2013. www.wumingfoundation.com/english/wumingblog/?p=1950 
Accessed August 4, 2013.
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